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Denial of Service in
Sensor Networks
S
ensor networks hold the promise of facili-
tating large-scale, real-time data processing
in complex environments. Their foreseeable
applications will help protect and monitor
military, environmental, safety-critical, or
domestic infrastructures and resources.
In these and other vital or security-sensitive
deployments, keeping the network available for 
its intended use is essential. The stakes are high:
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against such net-
works may permit real-world damage to the health
and safety of people. Without proper security mech-
anisms, networks will be conﬁned to limited, con-
trolled environments, negating much of the promise
they hold. The limited ability of individual sensor
nodes to thwart failure or attack makes ensuring
network availability more difﬁcult.
To identify DoS vulnerabilities, we analyze two
effective sensor network protocols that did not ini-
tially consider security. These examples demonstrate
that consideration of security at design time is the best
way to ensure successful network deployment.
THEORY AND APPLICATION
Advances in miniaturization combined with an insa-
tiable appetite for previously unrealizable informa- 
tion gathering have led to the development of new 
kinds of networks. In many areas, static infrastruc-
tures are giving way to dynamic ad hoc networks.
One manifestation of these trends is the develop-
ment of highly application-dependent sensor net-
works. Developers build sensor networks to collect
and analyze low-level data from an environment of
interest. Accomplishing the network’s goal often
depends on local cooperation, aggregation, or data
processing because individual nodes have limited
capabilities. Physically small, nodes have tiny or irre-
placeable power reserves, communicate wirelessly,
and may not possess unique identiﬁers. Further, they
must form ad hoc relationships in a dense network
with little or no preexisting infrastructure.
Protocols and algorithms operating in the network
must support large-scale distribution, often with only
localized interactions among nodes. The network
must continue operating even after signiﬁcant node
failure, and it must meet real-time requirements. In
addition to the limitations imposed by application-
dependent deadlines, because it reﬂects a changing
environment, the data the network gathers may
intrinsically be valid for only a short time. 
Sensor networks may be deployed in a host of
different environments, and they often ﬁgure into
military scenarios. These networks may gather
intelligence in battleﬁeld conditions, track enemy
troop movements, monitor a secured zone for activ-
ity, or measure damage and casualties. An airplane
or artillery
1 could deploy these networks to other-
wise unreachable regions.
Although military applications may be the easi-
est to imagine, much broader opportunities await.
Sensor networks could form an impromptu com-
munications network for rescue personnel at dis-
aster sites, or they could themselves help locate
casualties. They could monitor conditions at the
rim of a volcano, along an earthquake fault, or
around a critical water reservoir. Such networks
could also provide always-on monitoring of home
healthcare for the elderly or detect a chemical or
biological threat in an airport or stadium. 
Because of their low cost and low overhead, sen-
sor networks can be deployed for civic-event moni-
toring, then discarded. Longer-lived networks could
be periodically refreshed by new deployments, which
must integrate themselves into the existing sensor
network. The network must be resilient to individ-
ual node failure, since at any time nodes could be
destroyed, exhaust their power, or fail due to imper-
fections in large-scale manufacturing processes. 
Unless their developers take security into account at design time, 
sensor networks and the protocols they depend on will remain vulnerable
to denial-of-service attacks.
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COVER FEATUREFor many sensor network applications, security is
critical. Some face not only a harsh environment but
also active and intelligent opposition, which makes
the need for battleﬁeld resistance to location, destruc-
tion, and subversion obvious. Less obvious, but just
as important, are the demands in other arenas.
• Disasters. It may be necessary to protect the
location and status of casualties from unau-
thorized disclosure—particularly if the disaster
relates to ongoing terrorist activities instead of
natural causes. 
• Public safety. False alarms about chemical, bio-
logical, or environmental threats could cause
panic or disregard for warning systems. An
attack on the system’s availability could pre-
cede a real attack on the protected resource. 
• Home healthcare.Because protecting privacy is
paramount, only authorized users can query or
monitor the network. These networks also can
form critical pieces of an accident-notiﬁcation
chain, thus they must be protected from failure.
Protocols and software applications should con-
sider security in their original designs—as must sen-
sor networks, especially with regard to resisting
attacks on network availability. Attempts to add
security afterwards usually prove unsuccessful. 
THE DENIAL OF SERVICE THREAT
Strictly speaking, although we usually use the
term to refer to an adversary’s attempt to disrupt,
subvert, or destroy a network, a DoS attack is any
event that diminishes or eliminates a network’s
capacity to perform its expected function.
Hardware failures, software bugs, resource exhaus-
tion, environmental conditions, or any complicated
interaction between these factors can cause a DoS.
Although attackers commonly use the Internet to
exploit software bugs when making DoS attacks,
here we consider primarily protocol- or design-level
vulnerabilities.
Determining if a fault or collection of faults is the
result of an intentional DoS attack presents a con-
cern of its own—one that becomes even more difﬁ-
cult in large-scale deployments, which may have a
higher nominal failure rate of individual nodes. 
An intrusion-detection system monitors a host
or network for suspicious activity patterns such as
those that match some preprogrammed or possi-
bly learned rules about what constitutes normal or
abnormal behavior.
2Although we do not deal with
IDS strategies here, some of the research problems
overlap, particularly in the area of attack response.
Sensor networks destined for harsh environments
should already be designed to continue functioning
in the presence of faults. This robustness against
physical challenges may prevent some classes of
DoS attacks. Fault tolerance may mitigate even
node subversion, and efﬁcient protocols will limit
opportunities for malicious waste of resources. 
Developers must, however, factor the complica-
tion of an intelligent, determined adversary into the
design separately. For example, they can design sen-
sors to withstand the effects of normal thermal
cycles in a desert environment or to cope with tran-
sient irregularities in radio propagation. However,
this will not be sufﬁcient to thwart an attacker with
physical access to the node, who can move or heat
and cool the device at will. 
An adversary may possess a broad range of
attack capabilities. A physically damaged or manip-
ulated node used for attack may be less powerful
than a normally functioning node. Subverted nodes
that interact with the network only through soft-
ware are as powerful as other nodes. 
Some network deployments are vulnerable to
immensely more powerful adversaries. As a pre-
lude to military attack, a wireless sensor network
can be aerially deployed in enemy territory. If the
enemy already has a wired network and power grid
available and can interact with the newly deployed
sensor network, it can apply powerful back-end
resources to subvert or disrupt the new network.
This kind of asymmetry in capabilities presents a
daunting security challenge. 
A layered network architecture can improve
robustness by circumscribing layer interactions and
interfaces. A clean division of layers may be sacri-
ﬁced for performance in sensor networks, however,
reducing robustness. Each layer is vulnerable to dif-
ferent DoS attacks and has different options avail-
able for its defense. Some attacks crosscut multiple
layers or exploit interactions between them. 
Table 1 lists the layers of a typical sensor net-
work and describes each layer’s vulnerabilities and
defenses.
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Table 1. Sensor network layers and denial-of-service defenses.
Network layer Attacks  Defenses
Physical  Jamming  Spread-spectrum, priority messages, lower 
duty cycle, region mapping, mode change 
Tampering Tamper-proofing,  hiding 
Link Collision  Error-correcting  code 
Exhaustion Rate  limitation 
Unfairness Small  frames 
Network   Neglect and greed  Redundancy, probing 
and routing Homing  Encryption 
Misdirection  Egress filtering, authorization, monitoring 
Black holes  Authorization, monitoring, redundancy 
Transport Flooding  Client  puzzles 
Desynchronization Authentication 56 Computer
PHYSICAL LAYER
Nodes in a sensor network use wireless commu-
nication because the network’s ad hoc, large-scale
deployment makes anything else impractical. Base
stations or uplink nodes can use wired or satellite
communication, but limitations on their mobility
and energy make them more scarce. 
Jamming 
A well-known attack on wireless communica-
tion, jamming interferes with the radio frequencies
a network’s nodes are using. An adversary can dis-
rupt the entire network with k randomly distrib-
uted jamming nodes, putting N nodes out of
service, where k is much less than N. For single-
frequency networks, this attack is simple and 
effective. 
A node can easily distinguish jamming from the
failure of its neighbors by determining that con-
stant energy, not lack of response, impedes com-
munication. Both effects have similar results,
however, since constant jamming prevents nodes
from exchanging data or even reporting the attack
to remote monitoring stations. Even sporadic jam-
ming can be enough to cause disruption because
the data the network is communicating may be
valid for only a short time. 
The standard defense against jamming involves
various forms of spread-spectrum communication.
3
To attack frequency hoppers, jammers must be able
either to follow the precise hopping sequence or to
jam a wide section of the band. Mobile-phone net-
works commonly use code spreading as a defense
against jamming. Given that these abilities require
greater design complexity and more power, low-
cost, low-power sensor devices will likely be lim-
ited to single-frequency use. 
If the adversary can permanently jam the entire
network, effective and complete DoS results. Nodes
should have a strategy for combating jamming
attacks, however, such as switching to a lower duty
cycle and conserving as much power as possible.
Periodically, the nodes can wake up and check
whether the jamming has ended. By spending energy
frugally, the nodes may be able to outlive an adver-
sary, who must continue to jam at greater expense. 
When jamming is intermittent, nodes may be able
to send a few high-power, high-priority messages
back to a base station to report the attack, as Figure
1 shows. Nodes should cooperate to maximize the
probability of successfully delivering such messages,
which could mean switching to a prioritized trans-
mission scheme that minimizes collisions. Nodes can
also buffer high-priority messages indeﬁnitely, hop-
ing to relay them when a gap in the jamming occurs. 
In a large-scale deployment, an adversary is less
likely to succeed at jamming the entire network,
especially if only subverted sensors perform the
jamming. As Figure 2 shows, in this scenario a more
appropriate response would be to call on the nodes
surrounding the affected region to cooperatively
map and report the DoS attack boundary to a base
station.
To the surrounding nodes, however, the region
appears to suffer complete or intermittent failure,
and they may be unable to determine that this behav-
ior results from a DoS attack. Fortunately, in a suf-
ﬁciently dense network, some nodes will be located
close to the jamming signal’s edge. These nodes can
detect the higher-than-normal background noise and
report it to unaffected nodes outside the region, even
Figure 1. Defense against a jamming attack, phase one. Nodes along the edge of
a jammed region report the attack to their neighbors.
Jamming region
Jamming
report
J
Figure 2. Defense against a jamming attack, phase two. Neighboring nodes col-
laborate to map the jamming reports, then reroute trafﬁc around the jammed
region.
Mapped region
Rerouted traffic
J
Trafficif reception errors prevent the reporting nodes from
receiving reliable acknowledgments.
Another and more costly strategy responds to
jamming by using any available alternate modes of
communication, such as infrared or optical,
1 if the
attacker has not jammed them as well. 
Tampering 
An attacker can also tamper with nodes physi-
cally, and interrogate and compromise them—
threats that the large-scale, ad hoc, ubiquitous
nature of sensor networks exacerbates. Realistically,
we cannot expect to control access to hundreds of
nodes spread over several kilometers. Such net-
works can fall prey to true brute-force destruction,
but also to more sophisticated analysis.
4An attacker
can damage or replace sensor and computation
hardware or extract sensitive material such as cryp-
tographic keys to gain unrestricted access to higher
levels of communication. Node destruction may be
indistinguishable from fail-silent behavior. 
One defense involves tamper-prooﬁng the node’s
physical package. Its success depends on
• how accurately and completely designers con-
sidered potential threats at design time;
• the resources available for design, construc-
tion, and test; and
• the attacker’s cleverness and determination.
Defense against clever passersby and corrupt
insiders is easier and cheaper than defense against
well-funded governments.
4 When possible, the
node should react to tampering in a fail-complete
manner. It could, for example, erase cryptographic
or program memory. Other traditional physical
defenses include camouﬂaging or hiding nodes. 
LINK LAYER 
The link or media access control (MAC) layer pro-
vides channel arbitration for neighbor-to-neighbor
communication. Cooperative schemes that rely on
carrier sense, which let nodes detect if other nodes
are transmitting, are particularly vulnerable to DoS. 
Collision 
Adversaries may only need to induce a collision
in one octet of a transmission to disrupt an entire
packet. A change in the data portion would cause
a checksum mismatch at some other receiver. A cor-
rupted ACK control message could induce costly
exponential back-off in some MAC protocols. The
amount of energy the attacker needs, beyond that
required to listen for transmissions, is minute. 
Error-correcting codes provide a ﬂexible
mechanism for tolerating variable levels of
corruption in messages at any layer. However,
these codes work best as counters to envi-
ronmental or probabilistic errors. For a given
encoding, malicious nodes can still corrupt
more data than the network can correct,
although at greater cost. The error-correcting
codes themselves also incur additional pro-
cessing and communication overhead. 
The network can use collision detection to
identify these malicious collisions, which cre-
ate a kind of link-layer jamming, but no com-
pletely effective defense is known. Proper
transmission still requires cooperation
among nodes, which are expected to avoid cor-
ruption of others’ packets. A subverted node could
intentionally and repeatedly deny access to the
channel, expending much less energy than in full-
time jamming. 
Exhaustion
A naive link-layer implementation may attempt
retransmission repeatedly, even when triggered by
an unusually late collision, such as a collision
induced near the end of the frame. This active DoS
attack could culminate in the exhaustion of battery
resources in nearby nodes. This attack would com-
promise availability even if the adversary expended
no further effort. Random back-offs only decrease
the probability of inadvertent collision, thus they
would be ineffective at preventing this attack. 
Time-division multiplexing gives each node a slot
for transmission without requiring arbitration for
each frame. This approach could solve the indeﬁ-
nite postponement problem in a back-off algo-
rithm, but it is still susceptible to collisions.
A self-sacriﬁcing node could exploit the interac-
tive nature of most MAC-layer protocols in an
interrogation attack. For example, IEEE 802.11-
based MAC protocols use Request To Send, Clear
To Send, and Data/Ack messages to reserve chan-
nel access and transmit data. The node could
repeatedly request channel access with RTS, elicit-
ing a CTS response from the targeted neighbor.
Constant transmission would eventually exhaust
the energy resources of both nodes. 
One solution makes the MAC admission control
rate limiting, so that the network can ignore exces-
sive requests without sending expensive radio trans-
missions. This limit cannot drop below the expected
maximum data rate the network supports, though.
One design-time strategy for protection against bat-
tery-exhaustion attacks limits the extraneous
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responses the protocol requires. Designers
usually code this capability into the system
for general efﬁciency, but coding to handle
possible attacks may require additional logic. 
Unfairness
Intermittent application of these attacks or
abusing a cooperative MAC-layer priority
scheme can cause unfairness, a weaker form
of DoS. This threat may not entirely prevent
legitimate access to the channel, but it could
degrade service by, for example, causing users
of a real-time MAC protocol to miss their
deadlines. 
One defense against this threat uses small frames
so that an individual node can capture the channel
only for a short time. If the network typically trans-
mits long messages, however, this approach
increases framing overhead. Further, an adversary
can defeat this defense by cheating when vying for
access, such as by responding quickly while others
delay randomly. 
NETWORK AND ROUTING LAYER 
Higher layers may not require fully reliable
transmission streams, but the network layer pro-
vides a critical service nonetheless. In a large-scale
deployment, messages may traverse many hops
before reaching their destination. Unfortunately, as
the aggregate network cost of relaying a packet
increases, so does the probability that the network
will drop or misdirect the packet along the way. 
The absence of pre-existing infrastructure in sen-
sor networks means that most if not all the nodes
will serve as routers for through trafﬁc. Since every
node is potentially a router, this adds new vulner-
abilities to the network-layer problems experienced
on the Internet. Routing protocols must be simple
enough to scale up to large networks, yet robust
enough to cope with failures that occur many hops
away from a source. 
Neglect and greed 
One simple form of DoS attacks the node-as-
router vulnerability by arbitrarily neglecting to
route some messages. The subverted or malicious
node can still participate in lower-level protocols,
and may even acknowledge reception of data to the
sender, but it drops messages on a random or arbi-
trary basis. Such a node is neglectful. If it also gives
undue priority to its own messages, it is also greedy. 
The dynamic source routing (DSR)
5 protocol is
susceptible to this attack. Because the network
caches routes, communications from a region may
all use the same route to a destination. If a node
along that route is greedy, it may consistently
degrade or block traffic from the region to, for
example, a base station. 
Using multiple routing paths or sending redun-
dant messages can reduce the effect of this attack by
making it necessary for an adversary to subvert
more sensor nodes. Differentiating a greedy node
from a failed node can be difﬁcult, however, so pre-
vention is safer than relying on detection. 
Homing
In most sensor networks, some nodes will have
special responsibilities, such as being elected the
leader of a local group for coordination. More
powerful nodes might serve as cryptographic key
managers, query or monitoring access points, or
network uplinks. These nodes attract an adversary’s
interest because they provide critical services to the
network.
Location-based network protocols that rely on
geographic forwarding
6 expose the network to
homing attacks. Here, a passive adversary observes
trafﬁc, learning the presence and location of criti-
cal resources. Once found, these nodes can be
attacked by collaborators or mobile adversaries
using other active means. 
One approach to hiding important nodes pro-
vides conﬁdentiality for both message headers and
their content. If all neighbors share cryptographic
keys, the network can encrypt the headers at each
hop. This would prevent a passive adversary from
easily learning about the source or destination of
overheard messages, assuming a node has not been
subverted and remains in possession of valid
decryption keys. 
Misdirection 
A more active attack, misdirection, forwards
messages along wrong paths, perhaps by fabricat-
ing malicious route advertisements. As a mecha-
nism for diverting trafﬁc away from its intended
destination, this DoS attack targets the sender. By
misdirecting many trafﬁc ﬂows in one direction, the
DoS attack can target an arbitrary victim. 
In one variant of misdirection, Internet smurf
attacks,
7 the attacker forges the victim’s address as
the source of many broadcast Internet control-mes-
sage-protocol echoes. The attacker directs all the
echo replies back to the victim, ﬂooding its network
link. Among sensor network routing protocols,
DSR is also vulnerable to this attack. An adversary
can simply forge replies to route-discovery requests,
including victims in the spoofed route. 
Misdirection 
diverts trafﬁc 
from its intended
destination, 
perhaps by 
fabricating 
malicious route
advertisements.A sensor network that relies on a hierarchical
routing mechanism can use an approach similar to
the egress ﬁltering in Internet gateways, which can
help prevent smurf attacks. By verifying the source
addresses, parent routers can verify that all routed
packets from below could have been originated
legitimately by their children. 
Black holes
Distance-vector-based protocols
8provide another
easy avenue for an even more effective DoS attack.
Nodes advertise zero-cost routes to every other
node, forming routing black holes within the net-
work.
9 As their advertisement propagates, the net-
work routes more trafﬁc in their direction. In
addition to disrupting message delivery, this causes
intense resource contention around the malicious
node as neighbors compete for limited bandwidth.
These neighbors may themselves be exhausted pre-
maturely, causing a hole or partition in the network. 
Although nodes can detect a black-hole attack
more easily than they can detect greed, neglect, or
misdirection attacks, a black-hole attack is more
disruptive. Other nodes with untainted knowledge
of the network topology may suspect inconsistent
advertisements.
Authorization 
One defense against misdirection and black-hole
attacks lets only authorized nodes exchange rout-
ing information. Traditional wired networks with
comparatively few routers often take this approach.
Routers may use a public-key encryption infra-
structure to sign and verify routing updates. Sensor
networks place higher demands on scalability
because every node is by design a potential router. 
In addition to the computational and communi-
cation overhead, designers ﬁnd that key manage-
ment is difficult when using public-key cryptog-
raphy in sensor networks.
10 Nodes form ad hoc
relationships upon deployment, they may be
mobile, and additional nodes may replenish them
during their lifetime. A centralized certification
authority would create a single point of failure,
greatly hampering the network’s scalability. Lidong
Zhou and Zygmunt J. Haas, among others, have
proposed a mechanism for distributing the certiﬁ-
cation function among multiple servers.
11
Nodes can still be subverted with their key mate-
rial intact. This vulnerability could give an adver-
sary the unrestricted ability to construct valid
routing messages, although threshold cryptogra-
phy with share updating can protect against this
possibility.
12
Monitoring 
Nodes can also monitor their neighbors to
ensure that they observe proper routing
behavior. In one approach, the node relays a
message to the next hop and then acts as a
watchdog that verifies the next-hop trans-
mission of the same packet.
13 The watchdog
can detect misbehavior, subject to limitations
caused by collisions, asymmetric physical
connectivity, collusion, and so on. Watchdogs
inform a quality-rating mechanism, also run-
ning at each node, which chooses the most
reliable routes for message transmission in
much the same way that certain ﬂow-analy-
sis procedures work.
9
Probing 
A more active approach that does not require
every node to participate tests network connectiv-
ity by probing. Networks using geography-based
routing, such as Greedy Perimeter Stateless
Routing,
6can use knowledge of the physical topol-
ogy to detect black holes by periodically sending
probes that cross the network’s diameter. Subject
to transient routing errors and overload, a probing
node can identify blackout regions. 
A distributed probing scheme can also work.
9To
detect malicious nodes, probes must be indistin-
guishable from normal trafﬁc. Otherwise, neglect-
ful or greedy nodes could always choose to route
probes correctly, escaping detection.
Redundancy 
Redundancy  can lessen the probability of
encountering a malicious node. The network can
send duplicate messages along the same path to
protect against intermittent routing failure or ran-
dom malice. If each message uses a different path,
one of them might bypass consistently neglectful
adversaries or even black holes. A more clever
approach uses diversity coding
14 to send encoded
messages along different paths, but with lower cost
than full duplication.
TRANSPORT LAYER 
This layer manages end-to-end connections. The
service the layer provides can be as simple as an
unreliable area-to-area anycast, or as complex and
costly as a reliable sequenced-multicast bytestream.
Sensor networks tend to use simple protocols to
minimize the communication overhead of acknowl-
edgments and retransmissions. Protocols that pro-
vide sequencing share many DoS vulnerabilities
with the Internet transmission control protocol. 
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Flooding
Protocols that must maintain state at either
end are vulnerable to memory exhaustion
through ﬂooding. As in the classic TCP SYN
ﬂood,
15 an adversary sends many connection-
establishment requests to the victim. Each
request causes the victim to allocate resources
that maintain state for that connection. 
Limiting the number of connections pre-
vents complete resource exhaustion, which
would interfere with all other processes at the
victim. However, this solution also prevents
legitimate clients from connecting to the vic-
tim, as queues and tables ﬁll with abandoned
connections. Protocols that are connection-
less, and therefore stateless, can naturally
resist this type of attack somewhat, but they
may not provide adequate transport-level services
for the network. 
One defense requires clients to demonstrate the
commitment of their own resources to each con-
nection by solving client puzzles.
16 The server can
create and verify the puzzles easily, and storage of
client-speciﬁc information is not required while
clients are solving the puzzles. Servers distribute the
puzzle, and clients wishing to connect must solve
and present the puzzle to the server before receiving
a connection. An adversary must therefore be able to
commit far more computational resources per unit
time to ﬂood the server with valid connections.
Under heavy load, the server could scale the puzzles
to require even more work by potential clients. 
This solution is most appropriate for combating
adversaries that possess the same limitations as sen-
sor nodes. It has the disadvantage of requiring more
computational energy for legitimate sensor nodes,
but it is less costly than wasting radio transmissions
by ﬂooding. 
Desynchronization 
An existing connection between two end points
can be disrupted by desynchronization. In this
attack, the adversary repeatedly forges messages to
one or both end points. These messages carry
sequence numbers or control ﬂags that cause the end
points to request retransmission of missed frames.
If the adversary can maintain proper timing, it can
prevent the end points from exchanging any useful
information, causing them to waste energy in an end-
less synchronization-recovery protocol. 
One counter to this attack authenticates all pack-
ets exchanged, including all control fields in the
transport protocol header. Assuming that the
adversary also cannot forge the authentication
mechanism, the end points could then detect and
ignore the malicious packets.
PROTOCOL VULNERABILITIES
In our work, we have examined the vulnerabil-
ity of two sensor network protocols to DoS attacks.
Analyzing these vulnerabilities helps show why
developers should consider DoS susceptibility when
designing new protocols.
Adaptive rate control 
Alec Woo and David Culler describe a series of
improvements to standard MAC protocols
17 that
make them more applicable in sensor networks.
Key mechanisms include
• random delay for transmissions,
• back-off that shifts an application’s periodicity
phase,
• minimization of overhead in contention con-
trol mechanisms,
• passive adaptation of originating and route-
through admission control rates, and
• anticipatory delay for avoiding multihop hid-
den-node problems.
All of these features impressively improve MAC
layer performance, but they still must rely on coop-
eration among nodes.
For efficiency’s sake, Woo and Culler propose
giving preference to route-through trafﬁc in admis-
sion control by making its probabilistic multi-
plicative back-off factor 50 percent less than the
back-off factor of originating trafﬁc. This preserves
the network’s investment in packets that, poten-
tially, have already traversed many hops. 
However, this approach exposes a protocol vul-
nerability by offering an adversary the opportunity
to make flooding attacks more effective. High-
bandwidth packet streams that an adversary gen-
erates will receive preference during collisions that
can occur at every hop along their route. Thus, the
network must not only bear the malicious trafﬁc, it
also gives preference to it. 
This surprising interaction shows that an adver-
sary can exploit a reasonable approach to power
conservation and efﬁciency. 
RAP 
Chenyang Lu’s real-time location-based proto-
cols (RAP) provide a real-time communication
architecture integrating a query-event service API
and geographic forwarding with a novel velocity
monotonic scheduling (VMS) policy.
18 As Figure 3
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a connection.shows, the architecture encompasses several net-
work layers, from a prioritized MAC layer to the
query-event API just below the application layer.
The VMS layer stamps packets with a desired
velocity, calculated from the distance to travel and
the end-to-end deadline. The originator can com-
pute the velocity statically or the network can
recompute it dynamically at each intermediate
node, based on the distance left and the time taken
so far. Nodes schedule packet relay by giving higher
priority to higher-velocity packets. 
An adversary can exploit the RAP protocol’s vul-
nerabilities by flooding the entire network with
high-velocity packets to waste bandwidth and
energy. The attacker can achieve high velocities
either by making the deadline short or by making
the distance extraordinarily large. Packets with
short deadlines will be quickly dropped, however,
when they inevitably miss their deadlines. So an
adversary can inject messages with geographic des-
tinations far away, perhaps outside the entire sen-
sor network. The error may not be discovered until
the message reaches the network’s edge; until then,
the message wastes high-priority bandwidth in the
interior.
This attack could succeed even if the network
uses a location directory service that could detect
these out-of-area packets. For efﬁciency, a message’s
originator typically invokes this service to locate
the destination node. Once determined, the packet
includes the destination so that intermediate nodes
only need to make local forwarding decisions. The
adversary would avoid contacting the directory 
service, and the malicious location would go 
undetected.
In dynamically recomputed velocity scheduling,
each node recomputes the velocity for route-
through packets. A malicious node could just drop
the packet—an attack of neglect. However, the
malicious node can escape the attention of moni-
tors and watchdogs by intentionally lowering its
velocity so that the packet misses its deadline at the
destination—a variant of a misdirection attack.
When the network ﬁnally detects the missed dead-
line, it may be impossible to determine where along
the path a malicious delay occurred. 
Statically computed velocity scheduling may be
more amenable to cryptographic protection. Since
only the originator computes a velocity, a message
authentication code may sign or protect this value.
Each node could then check whether upstream
routers have tampered with the velocity. 
RAP can use clock synchronization so that each
node can prioritize all packets based on the time
left before their deadlines and their distances. One
optimization in the protocol drops packets that
miss their deadlines from forwarding queues, mak-
ing room for other packets. This combination
could lead to a very effective DoS if the adversary
can attack the clock-synchronization mechanism
successfully. A desynchronized node with a sufﬁ-
ciently erroneous clock will always choose to drop
packets instead of forwarding them. This attack
also amounts to an adversary inducing the node to
become a routing black hole. 
A
ttempts to add DoS resistance to existing pro-
tocols often focus on cryptographic-authen-
tication mechanisms. Aside from the limited
resources that make digital-signature schemes
impractical, authentication in sensor networks
poses serious complications. It is unclear how to
establish trust, or even identity, in large-scale ad
hoc deployments of potentially ID-less nodes.
Adding security afterward often fails even in sys-
tems without these additional constraints.
Design-time consideration of security offers the
most effective defense against attacks on availabil-
ity. Applying defensive strategies can mitigate even
problems that seem unsolvable, as in the case of
cooperatively mapping jammed regions. Ignoring
DoS vulnerabilities can lead to the unexpectedly
easy compromise of network resources, as in adap-
tive rate control’s potential preference for malicious
trafﬁc. 
Security is the linchpin of good sensor network
design. Without sufﬁcient protection from DoS and
other attacks, sensor networks may not be deploy-
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Figure 3. Real-time location-based protocols (RAP)
architecture. RAP encompasses several network layers,
from a prioritized media-access-control layer to the
query-event API just below the application layer.
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able in many areas. They will only be suitable for
limited, controlled environments—falling far short
of their promise.  
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